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BIFURCATED PROCEEDINGS IN ILLINOIS: SURVIVOR ACTIONS TO ARBITRATION BUT 
WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS TO LITIGATION 
 
Joshua Bower
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 In Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC,
 1
  a special administrator of a former 
nursing home resident’s estate asserted claims under the Nursing Home Care Act 
(“NHCA”)2 and the Wrongful Death Act (“WDA”).3 The nursing home operator filed a 
motion to compel arbitration that was denied by the trial court because of the agreement 
lacked “mutuality of obligation” and the plaintiff was a nonsignatory to the arbitration 
agreement in her personal capacity.
4
 Eventually, the Illinois Supreme Court held that 
general contract principles only require consideration for a valid arbitration agreement, 
not “mutuality of obligation.”5 The Court also held that a wrongful-death claim was not 
an “asset” of resident's estate that the resident could limit via an arbitration agreement, 
but the special representative was bound to arbitrate survivor claims based on the 
NHCA.
6
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 In 2005 and 2006, Ms. Gott entered into two separate arbitration agreements with 
a nursing home belonging to the defendant, SSC Odin Operation Company, LLC 
(“Odin”).7 Her first residency was from May 20, 2005 until July 29, 2005.8 While being 
admitted, the plaintiff Ms. Carter, acting as Gott’s legal representative, executed a written 
“Health Care Arbitration Agreement” with Odin.9 The second residency occurred from 
January 12, 2006 until Gott’s death on January 31, 2006.10 Six days after admission, Gott, 
not Carter acting as a representative, signed the “Health Care Arbitration Agreement” 
with Odin.
11
 Both agreements contained identical terms and conditions.
12
  
 The parties agreed to submit “all disputes . . . arising out of or in any way related 
or connected to the Admission Agreement and all matters related thereto including 
matters involving the Resident's stay and care provided at the Facility” where the amount 
                                                 
*
 Joshua Bower is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2014 Juris 
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1
 Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344 (Ill. 2012).  
2
 Nursing Home Care Act, 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/1-101 (2013). 
3
 Wrongful Death Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1 (2013). 
4
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 348 (citing Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 885 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2008) rev'd, 927 N.E.2d 1207 (Ill. 2010).  
5
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 351. 
6
 Id. at 360. 
7
 Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 348 (Ill. 2012). 
8
 Id.  
9
 Id. at 348 (citing Carter, 237 Ill. 2d 30 at 33, 927 N.E.2d at 1210 (2010)).  
10
 Carter, 976 N.E. at 348. 
11
 Id. (citing Carter, 927 N.E.2d at 1211). 
12
 Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 348 (Ill. 2012). 
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in controversy is at least $200,000, to “binding arbitration.”13 The agreements bound 
“each other and their representatives, affiliates, governing bodies, agents and 
employees.”14 The arbitration sought to cover any dispute whether the cause of action 
was based on contract, tort, or state or federal statutory rights.
15
 Odin also agreed to pay 
the arbitrator fees, up to $5,000 of attorney’s fees, and gave the resident “the right to 
choose the location of the arbitration.”16  
 After Gott’s death, Carter, acting as the special administrator of Gott’s estate, 
brought two counts against Odin.
17
 The first count alleged that Odin violated the NHCA 
when Gott sustained gastrointestinal bleeding, anemia, and respiratory failure during her 
second residency.
18
 Under the NHCA, this count was considered a survival action under 
Illinois law.
19
 The second count sought recovery under the WDA for Gott’s heirs.20 
Odin filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied after a 
briefing without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
21
 The trial court found that the 
arbitration agreements violated state public policy, lacked mutuality of obligation, 
involved intrastate commerce, and were not governed by the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”).22 The appellate court affirmed the decision, reasoning that the antiwaiver 
provisions in the NHCA presented a valid state law contract defense.
23
 The Illinois 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, reasoning that the anti-waiver provisions 
were the “functional equivalent” of anti-arbitration legislation, which is “preempted by 
the FAA and Supreme Court precedent.”24 
The appellate court, on remand, once again affirmed the trial court’s denial of the 
motion to compel arbitration, holding the agreements unenforceable due to a lack of 
mutuality of obligation and that the plaintiff could not be compelled to arbitrate since she 
did not sign in her individual capacity.
25
 The Illinois Supreme Court then granted the 
defendant’s petition for leave to appeal to consider (1) the enforceability of the arbitration 
agreement and (2) the arbitrability of the wrongful-death claim.
26
 The standard of review 
would be de novo since the issues consider “statutory construction.”27 
                                                 
13
 Id. 
14
 Id. at 348. 
15
 Id. at 349. 
16
 Id. 
17
 Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 348 (Ill. 2012). 
18
 Id.  
19
 Id. at 348. 
20
 Id.  
21
 Id. at 349.  
22
 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 349 (citing Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 885 
N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)).  
23
 Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 349 (Ill. 2012) (citing Carter, 885 N.E.2d 
at 1204). 
24
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 349 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding state 
courts have no basis other than standard defenses to contract validity to challenge arbitration provisions)).  
25
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 349 (citing Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 955 N.E.2d 1233, reh'g 
denied (Sept. 16, 2011), appeal allowed, 963 N.E.2d 244 (Ill. 2012) and aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 976 
N.E.2d 344)). 
26
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 349. 
27
 Id. (citing Royal Indem. Co. v. Chicago Hosp. Risk Pooling Program, 865 N.E.2d 317, 321 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2007).  
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III. COURT’S ANALYSIS 
A. Mutuality of Obligation 
 The Court began its analysis by recognizing that Section 2 of the FAA allows 
state law contract defenses to invalidate an arbitration agreement only when the defenses 
are generally applicable to all contracts.
28
 An arbitration agreement cannot be invalidated 
by a state statute that only targets arbitration agreements.
29
 Since Illinois state law only 
requires consideration for a contract to be valid, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to 
require mutuality of obligation for arbitration agreements.
30
 The Court defined 
consideration as “[a]ny act or promise which is of benefit to one party or disadvantage to 
the other is a sufficient consideration to support a contract.”31 Courts cannot inquire into 
the “adequacy”32 of the consideration nor require that the “values . . . exchanged be 
equivalent.”33  
The Court found that the “defendant's promise to pay the arbitrators' fees; 
defendant's promise to pay $5,000 of Gott's attorney fees and costs in any action against 
defendant; and Gott's right to choose the location of the arbitration” each constituted 
sufficient consideration.
34
 The Court was not persuaded by Carter’s argument that the 
promise to pay attorney’s fees was insufficient consideration since Odin was already 
required to pay these fees under the NHCA.
35
 The Court pointed out that Carter could 
only recover attorney’s fees under the NHCA if she prevailed, while the arbitral 
agreement guaranteed $5,000 toward her attorney fees despite the outcome.
36
  
B. Wrongful Death Action Not an Asset of Estate that Can Be Limited by 
Decedent  
 The Court then addressed whether Carter could be compelled to arbitrate the 
wrongful-death claim as a nonsignatory to the arbitration agreements.
37
 Odin argued that 
a wrongful-death action is an asset of the decedent’s estate that can be limited by the 
decedent during her lifetime.
38
 Since the decedent agreed to have “any and all disputes” 
                                                 
28
 Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 350 (Ill. 2012) (quoting Doctor's Assocs., 
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996) (“[g]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, 
duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements”)). 
29
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 350 (citing Doctor's Associates, Inc., 517 U.S. at 687).  
30
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 353. 
31
 Id. at 351 (quoting Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 371 N.E.2d 634, 639 (Ill. 1977)).  
32
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 351  (quoting Gallagher v. Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 64 (Ill. 2007)).  
33
 Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 351 (Ill. 2012) (citing Keefe v. Allied 
Home Mortg. Corp., 912 N.E.2d 310, 315 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); see also Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 
183 F.3d 173, 180 (3d Cir.1999) (observing that “state courts have concluded that an arbitration clause 
need not be supported by equivalent obligations”)). 
34
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 353 (emphasis added).  
35
 Id. 
36
 Id.  
37
 Id. (nonsignatory in her personal capacity); see generally E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 
279, 294 (2002) (“It goes without saying that a contract cannot bind a nonparty”). 
38
 Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 353 (Ill. 2012) . 
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settled by arbitration, her beneficiaries are bound by that agreement.
39
 In essence, Odin 
argued that a wrongful-death action is derivative of the decedent’s cause of action had 
she lived.
40
 The Court was not persuaded by this argument and held that a wrongful-death 
action is not derivative of the decedent’s estate.41  
The Court acknowledged that a wrongful-death cause of action arises from the 
Illinois WDA.
42
 Section 2 requires that a wrongful-death suit to be filed for “the 
exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin of such deceased person.”43 The 
Court contrasted a wrongful-death action to a survival action, which belongs to the 
decedent’s estate.44 The difference being that “[a] survival action allows for recovery of 
damages for injury sustained by the deceased up to the time of death,” while a wrongful-
death action “covers the time after death and addresses the injury suffered by the next of 
kin due to the loss of the deceased rather than the injuries personally suffered by the 
deceased prior to death.”45  
Odin specifically cited WDA Section 2.1, which states “[i]n the event that the 
only asset of the deceased estate is a cause of action arising under this Act . . .,”46  to 
argue that the wrongful-death claim is an “asset” of the decedent’s estate that can be 
limited by the decedent during her lifetime.
47
 After evaluating the legislative intent and 
history behind the “estate” language, the Court rejected this argument.48 
The Court examined how the legislature refused to treat a wrongful-death claim 
like other assets under the Probate Act.
49
 Unlike other assets under the Probate Act, a 
wrongful-death claim cannot be subject to the creditor’s claims nor “chargeable with the 
expenses of estate administration.”50 While other assets are distributable according to a 
will or intestacy law, a wrongful-death claim is not subject to the Probate Act and is 
distributed to “each surviving spouse and next of kin . . . in proportion, determined by the 
court.”51 The Court also noted that the legislature has not amended the WDA to change 
this distribution.
52
  
The Court agreed with the reasoning found in In Re Estate of Savio;
53
 specifically 
that, the purpose of the term “asset” is to “facilitate the filing and prosecution of a 
                                                 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id.  
41
 Id. at 354. 
42
 Id.   
43
 Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 354 (Ill. 2012) (quoting 740 ILL. COMP. 
STAT.180/2 (2006)). 
44
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 354  (quoting 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27–6 (2006)); see also Vincent v. 
Alden–Park Strathmoor, Inc., 948 N.E.2d 610 (Ill. 2011). 
45
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 353 (quoting Wyness v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 546 N.E.2d 568 (Ill. 
1989)). 
46
 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/2.1 (2006) (emphasis added). 
47
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 353. 
48
 Id. at 353-54. 
49
 Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 355 (Ill. 2012) (citing 755 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/18–14 (2006)). 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. at 356. 
53
 In re Estate of Savio, 902 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
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wrongful-death claim,” but not to “allow the deceased to control the forum and manner in 
which a wrongful-death claim . . . is determined.”54 
The Court further supported its conclusion by analyzing the legislative history.
55
 
The Court cited Representative Beatty to conclude that the legislature intended the term 
“asset” to “‘make it more convenient’ to bring a wrongful-death action, and ‘cut the red 
tape’ by permitting a court to appoint a special administrator who could prosecute the 
action without opening an estate.”56  
C.  Survivor Actions Go to Arbitration; Wrongful Death Claims to Court  
Although a claim under the WDA is considered “derivative”57 because the 
personal representative can only bring a claim if the decedent had a right of action at the 
time of their death,
58
 the Illinois Supreme Court refused to let the action be limited by an 
arbitration agreement.
59
  
Generally, a beneficiary’s right to sue depends on what causes of action the 
decedent had at the time of their death.
60
 Odin argued that “just as a decedent's settlement 
of a personal injury action constitutes a complete bar to a wrongful-death action based on 
the same occurrence . . . Gott's agreement to arbitrate . . . limits the wrongful-death action 
in the same manner.”61 The Court was not persuaded by this argument and found that 
“the derivative nature of a wrongful-death action does not mean that she is subject to any 
and all contractual limitations—such as an agreement to arbitrate—that are applicable to 
the decedent.”62 The Court concluded that the plaintiff was “a nonparty to the arbitration 
agreements” and could not be made to arbitrate the wrongful death action.63  
Generally, contract law only compels parties to arbitrate if they were signatories 
to the arbitration agreement.
64
 Since the plaintiff only signed the first arbitration 
agreement as Gott’s legal representative, she is only required to arbitrate claims where 
                                                 
54
 Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 357 (Ill. 2012). 
55
 Id.  
56
 Id. (citing 80th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 3, 1977, at 142 (statement of Rep. 
Beatty)). 
57
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 357  (citing Varelis v. Northwestern Mem’l Hosp., 657 N.E.2d 997 (Ill. 
1995)). 
58
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 357 (quoting Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Serv., 30 N.E.2d 14, 18 (Ill. 1940) (“the 
deceased had no right of action at the time of his or her death, then the deceased's personal representative 
has no right of action under the Wrongful Death Act”)). 
59
 Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 359 (Ill. 2012). 
60
 Id. (citing Mooney v. Chicago, 88 N.E. 194, 196 (Ill. 1909) (beneficiary could not file a wrongful 
death claim since decedent released his employer from all liability after a settlement for his personal injury 
action)). 
61
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 358. 
62
 Id. at 359; see also Bybee v. Abdulla, 189 P.3d 40, 46 (Utah 2008) (although decedent is “master of 
his own claim,” he does not have power to bind beneficiaries to arbitration). 
63
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 359; see also Finney v. Nat’l Healthcare Corp., 193 S.W.3d 393, 395 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2006) (holding that a wrongful-death action does not belong to the decedent or decedent’s estate and 
thus beneficiary does not “stand in shoes of decedent”).  
64
Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 359 (Ill. 2012); see Gingiss Int’l, Inc. v. 
Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir.1995); Vukusich v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 150 Ill.App.3d 
634, 640 (1986)).  
310 
 
she acts in Gott’s place.65 The Court concluded that the plaintiff must arbitrate the 
survivor action filed under the NHCA since she is acting in decedent’s stead.66 However, 
the wrongful-death cause of action belongs to the next of kin and not the decedent’s 
estate, thus the plaintiff was not required to arbitrate that claim.
67
 
The Court distinguished the present case from a recent United States Supreme 
Court decision, Marmet Health Center, Inc. v. Brown.
68
 In Marmet, a family member of 
the decedent signed an arbitration agreement and later brought suits for negligence.
69
 The 
West Virginia Supreme Court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement due to the 
public policy against pre-dispute personal injury or wrongful-death arbitration 
agreements.
70
 The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that the “FAA's text 
includes no exception for personal injury or wrongful-death claims . . . and the 
prohibition . . . is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim, 
and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA.”71 The Illinois Supreme 
Court distinguished its holding from Marmet since its decision was not dependent on “a 
categorical anti-arbitration rule,” but basic “common law principles governing all 
contracts.”72  
IV. SIGNIFICANCE 
A. Mutuality of Obligation Not Required, Only Consideration Needed 
The Illinois Supreme Court did not require mutuality of obligation for arbitration 
agreements, only that each party gives the other proper consideration.
73
 It will not, 
however, evaluate the adequacy of consideration.
74
 The Court defined consideration as 
“any act or promise which is of benefit to one party or disadvantage to the other is a 
sufficient consideration to support a contract.”75 The Court also concluded that 
contractual promises to pay for the arbitrator’s fees, partial payment for attorney’s fees, 
and the right to choose the location of arbitration were each individually sufficient 
                                                 
65
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 360. 
66
 Id. 
67
 Id.  
68
 Id. (citing Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012)). 
69
 Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 360 (Ill. 2012) (citing Marmet Health 
Care Ctr., Inc., 132 S.Ct. at 1204). 
70
 Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250 (W. Va. 2011) cert. granted, judgment vacated 
sub nom., Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012). 
71
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 360 (citing Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 1204).  
72
 Id. (citing Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 1204).   
73
 Id. (citing Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Cont’l Can Co., 133 N.E. 711, 714 (Ill. 1921) (“any 
other consideration for the contract mutuality of obligation is not essential”)). 
74
 Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 353 (Ill. 2012); see also Gallagher v. 
Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 64 (Ill. 2007); Ryan v. Hamilton, 68 N.E. 781, 782 (Ill. 1903) (“adequacy of the 
consideration is within the exclusive dominion of the parties where they contract freely and without 
fraud”). 
75
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 353; see also Steinberg v. Chicago Med. Sch., 371 N.E.2d 634, 639 (Ill. 1977) 
([a]ny act or promise which is of benefit to one party or disadvantage to the other is a sufficient 
consideration to support a contract”).  
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consideration.
76
 The court implied that the right to choose location alone would be 
sufficient consideration for the weaker party’s agreement to arbitrate.77 
By only requiring consideration by both parties as opposed to mutuality of 
obligation, the Illinois Supreme Court increased the likelihood that arbitration provisions 
would be enforced by courts. This ruling also continues the trend of enforcing adhesive 
arbitration agreements.
78
 Consideration sets a lower bar that is more easily met than 
mutuality of obligation. Courts, being quite familiar with general principles of contract 
law, will quickly and proficiently be able to apply those standards to arbitration 
provisions.  
When drafting arbitration agreements, practitioners should include provisions that 
clearly benefit the other party to their own detriment. Case law indicates that courts seem 
to favor agreements wherein the stronger party agrees to bear the cost of arbitration, 
especially where the weaker party enters the agreement under adhesive circumstances.
79
 
Although the Illinois Supreme Court stated that the right to choose the arbitration 
location alone was sufficient consideration, practitioners should be aware that some 
courts would likely rule such provisions unconscionable.
80
   
B. Third-Party Beneficiaries Cannot Be Compelled to Arbitrate Wrongful Death 
Claims Since Claims are Not Derivative of Estate 
In Illinois, healthcare facilities are unable to compel third-party beneficiaries to 
arbitrate wrongful-death claims even if the decedent agreed to bind their 
“representatives.”81 The Illinois Supreme Court’s holding makes it much more difficult 
for healthcare facilities to arbitrate wrongful-death claims. To ensure arbitrability, a 
healthcare provider would need to seek out the signature of the future personal 
representative of the decedent or the decedent’s potential heirs. As one court points out, 
this requirement is unrealistic and impractical since potential heirs “are not even 
identified until the time of death,” may not “be available at time required,” or “refuse to 
                                                 
76
 Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 353. 
77
 Id. (defendant's promise to pay the arbitrators' fees, attorney’s fees, and Gott's right to choose the 
location of the arbitration, each constitute a benefit to Gott and a detriment to defendant). 
78
 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1742 (2011) (striking down California 
judicial precedent, permits adhesive arbitration agreements featuring class action waivers in consumer 
settings). 
79
 See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000) (holding that the party 
seeking invalidation of an arbitration agreement because it would be “prohibitively expensive . . . bears the 
burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs” has caused variety of responses among lower 
courts); see also Scovill v. WSYX/ABC, 425 F.3d 1012 (6th Cir. 2005) (refused to enforce the “loser pays” 
cost-shifting provision); but see Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs., VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269 (3d Cir. 2004) (a 
provision that allowed employer to be reimbursed for arbitrator’s fees and expenses by employee not 
deemed unconscionable).   
80
 Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 353 (Ill. 2012). 
81
 Id. 
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sign.”82 Furthermore, state and federal patient privacy statutes prevent health facilities 
from requiring the disclosure of sensitive medical information.
83
  
Whether a third-party beneficiary can be compelled to arbitrate is highly 
dependent on whether that particular state classifies a wrongful-death action as a 
derivative right or an independent third-party right. The majority of states have ruled that 
third-party beneficiaries can be compelled to arbitrate. These states include: Alabama,
84
 
California,
85
 Indiana,
86
 Mississippi,
87
 and Texas.
88
 A minority of states including 
Kentucky,
89
 Missouri,
90
 Ohio,
91
 and Washington
92
 refuse to compel arbitration for non-
signatory beneficiaries. A handful of states refused to compel arbitration on the basis of 
agency law.
93
 The Florida Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Laizure v. Avante 
at Leesburg, Inc. to decide this issue.
94
  
                                                 
82
 Herbert v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. App. 3d 718 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).  
83
 See generally Health Ins. Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 29 (2006)); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6922 (West 2012) 
(parental consent not required for minors seeking specific medical treatment). 
84
 See Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So. 2d 661, 665 (Ala. 2004) (executor and 
administratrix of estates of nursing home residents bound by arbitration provisions since they “stand in the 
shoes of the decedent,” therefore have the same powers and restrictions as decedent); see also Entrekin v. 
Internal Med. Assocs. of Dothan, P.A., 689 F.3d 1248, 1250 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Under Alabama law, 
executor . . . required to arbitrate her wrongful death claim . . . even though executor did not personally 
sign agreement since resident was bound by agreement during her life”). 
85
 See Ruiz v. Podolsky, 237 P.3d 584, 594-95 (Cal. 2010) (compelled arbitration for all wrongful 
death claimants since broad arbitration agreement included “any spouses or heirs . . . and any children” and 
health care facilities’ “reasonable contractual expectations” would be defeated otherwise). 
86
 See Sanford v. Castleton Health Care Ctr., LLC, 813 N.E.2d 411, 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (third-
party beneficiaries compelled to arbitrate because state statute “only allows a personal representative to 
maintain a cause of action ‘if the decedent, if alive, might have maintained’”). 
87
 See Trinity Mission Health & Rehab. of Clinton v. Estate of Scott, 19 So. 3d 735, 740 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2008) (compelled arbitration, finding that wrongful-death action is derivative, thus beneficiary must 
stand in the position of decedent. Since decedent’s claims “would have been subject to arbitration,” so must 
beneficiaries’).  
88
 See In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Tex. 2009) (compelled arbitration since 
under state statute, “wrongful death beneficiaries may pursue a cause of action…only if the individual 
injured would have been entitled to bring an action for the injury if the individual had lived”). 
89
 See Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 599 (Ky. 2012) (refused to compel arbitration 
because beneficiaries’ claim is not “derived through or on behalf of the Resident”). 
90
 See Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, 273 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Mo. 2009) (refused to compel arbitration 
because “[w]rongful death statute creates a new cause of action . . . does not revive a cause of action 
belonging to the deceased; the right of action thus created is neither a transmitted right nor a survival 
right”).    
91
 See Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., 2006-Ohio-382 aff'd, 2007-Ohio-4787, 115 Ohio St. 3d 
134, 138, 873 N.E.2d 1258, 1262 (refused to compel arbitration since “survival claims and wrongful-death 
claims are distinct claims that belong to separate individuals”).  
92
 See Woodall v. Avalon Care Ctr.-Fed. Way, LLC, 231 P.3d 1252, 1256 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) 
(refused to compel arbitration since wrongful death statutes “create new causes of action for the benefit of 
specific surviving relatives,” thus not derivative). 
93
 See Munn v. Haymount Rehab. & Nursing Ctr., Inc., 704 S.E.2d 290, 295 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) 
(refused to compel arbitration on grounds that beneficiary lacked agency to enter the decedent into 
arbitration agreement). 
94
See Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc., 51 So. 3d 465 (Fla. 2010) ; see also Laizure v. Avante at 
Leesburg, Inc., 44 So. 3d 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that wrongful death claim was arbitrable 
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V. CRITIQUE 
A. Bifurcation of Claims Creates an Ineffective Procedure Causing Higher 
Costs and Disparate Outcomes 
This ruling places a heavy burden on the court system and on the parties involved 
by requiring two separate adjudicative proceedings based on practically identical facts. In 
Illinois, survival claims, such as claims under the NHCA, are subject to arbitration. 
Wrongful-death claims, however, are not. With this separation, the Illinois Supreme 
Court invites disparate outcomes, multiple “bites at the same apple,” and raises costs for 
all parties involved. This undermines the efficacy of arbitration.  
Both the survival claim and the wrongful-death claim concern the same tortious 
events. In spite of this reality, the Carter decision forces healthcare facilities and 
beneficiaries into two separate proceedings
95
 based on similar, if not identical, facts with 
the possibility of drastically different outcomes. This outcome is despised by the legal 
system and should be avoided.
96
 This bifurcated procedure is quite costly, with the 
healthcare provider bearing the brunt of the costs. Using the instant case as a model, if 
Carter sought recovery for both claims, Odin would be responsible for any arbitration 
fees, up to $5,000 in attorney’s fees for Carter related to the arbitration, their own 
attorney fees for arbitration, and their own attorney fees and court costs for litigation. 
Furthermore, if Carter prevails in litigation, Odin would also be responsible for Carter’s 
attorney fees under the NHCA.
97
 This assessment does not include the cost of expert 
witnesses or economic waste of witnesses wasting valuable time and money testifying on 
the same essential facts in two different proceedings. It is clear that the beneficiaries now 
have considerable bargaining power with the threat of costly court proceedings to force 
healthcare facilities into settlements. 
Even with the split proceeding option, beneficiaries may agree to post-dispute 
arbitration since the healthcare facilities usually agree to bear the cost of arbitration. 
Healthcare facilities should offer incentives to persuade the beneficiary to agree to post-
dispute arbitration such as paying the arbitration fees or covering some attorney costs.
98
 
This will cause the arbitration proceeding to be more costly for the healthcare facilities 
than if all disputes went to arbitration due to a pre-dispute agreement.     
                                                 
because within scope of arbitration provision and “replaced the personal injury claim” that patient could of 
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STAT. 45/3-602 (2013) (licensee shall pay the actual damages and costs and attorney's fees to a facility 
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Since reviewing courts must be highly deferential toward arbitral awards,
99
 
bifurcated proceedings create a very real possibility of a court speaking out of both sides 
of its mouth. Suppose the court denies recovery for the wrongful-death claim yet the 
arbitrator finds for the beneficiary in the survivor claim. The court will likely have to 
affirm the arbitral award, even though it stands in direct opposition to its own finding.  
This ruling also undermines the express intent of the parties involved and the 
“bargained-for” exchange. The arbitration agreement expressly sought to bind the patient 
and her “successors, assigns, agents, attorneys, insurers, heirs, trustees, and 
representatives, including the personal representative or executor of her estate.”100 By 
ignoring the express intent of the parties, the Court undermines one of the core tenants of 
arbitration, that it is a voluntarily agreement entered into by both parties seeking an 
efficient adjudication of their dispute.
101
  
 The most efficient and economical procedure would have required both the 
wrongful-death and survivor claims to be decided by one adjudicator, the arbitrator. Yet 
the Illinois Supreme Court has chosen bifurcated proceedings for tortious claims resting 
on essentially the same facts. While expanding the policy favoring arbitration by only 
requiring consideration for contract validity, the Court simultaneously narrowed the 
scope of arbitration by bifurcating wrongful-death claims from arbitration.  
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